Showing posts with label fiscal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fiscal. Show all posts
Sunday, March 23, 2014
Bank Economist See Acceleration After Fiscal Cliff Drag
The fiscal cliff agreement has created headwinds early in 2013, resulting in an economy that will grow slowly in the first half of the year before improving to a moderate pace in the second half, according to the Economic Advisory Committee of the American Bankers Association. The committee warns that the tax hikes, a protracted fight over the debt ceiling and the possibility of severe spending cuts in 2013 have the potential to stop our economy in its tracks.
According to the committee, which includes 13 chief economists from among the largest banks in North America, inflation-adjusted GDP growth for the first half of 2013 will be below 2 percent, and is expected to increase to 2.6 percent in this year’s fourth quarter.
The group believes the economy will be shaped this year by the struggle between private sector momentum and the inevitable fiscal drag that comes from the tax and spending decisions made by Congress.
The private sector economy appears poised for sustainable growth. However, the tax hikes made at the start of 2013 will create a drag on GDP growth of at least 1.25 percent, and additional budget cuts from sequestration could further restrain growth.
“If you double down on austerity this year, you’re flirting with recession,” Scott Anderson, committee chairman and Bank of the West chief economist, said. “Resolving the debt ceiling and providing clarity on taxes and spending will boost confidence, opening the door for faster growth at a critical point in the economic expansion.”
While job creation is expected to weaken in the first half of 2013, the bank economists predict that unemployment will continue its slow but steady decline.
“The committee’s consensus is that unemployment will fall to 7.4 percent by year-end,” Anderson said.
The committee sees the housing recovery gaining strength this year, with improving construction levels and rising home sales and prices combining to bolster the housing market in 2013. The committee forecast is that home prices nationwide will rise 4.3 percent and residential investment will increase 12.9 percent.
“Rising home prices create a wealth effect that’s critical to supporting consumer spending and economic expansion,” Anderson said.
According to the committee, consumer spending growth will be positive, but will not improve from last year’s pace. Consumer spending, which represents 70 percent of the economy, is expected to grow only 1.8 percent for 2013 as a whole - about the same as last year.
“We expect consumer spending to slow in the first half of this year as higher taxes reduce consumers’ take-home pay,” Anderson said. “Consumer spending will pick up in the second half of 2013 as housing activity and consumer confidence gain strength.”
While the committee forecasts a slight rise in long-term interest rates, short-term rates will remain exceptionally low in 2013.
“Short-term interest rates are anchored by current Fed monetary policy,” Anderson said. The committee noted that the Federal Reserve has adopted thresholds of 2.5 percent on its inflation forecast and 6.5 percent on the unemployment rate before it would consider raising the Fed Funds rate.
“The committee doesn’t see the unemployment rate falling to 6.5 percent until May 2015,” Anderson said.
The bank economists forecast that credit growth in 2012 will continue this year. Loans to businesses are expected to grow 6.5 percent in 2013, while loans to individuals are expected to increase 5.0 percent.
“The increase in business lending shows that banks are doing their part to make loans that finance our economy,” Anderson said.
The group sees the federal budget deficit continuing to decline, but remaining at unsustainably high levels. The committee’s forecast is for the federal deficit to fall to $925 billion in 2013 and to $738 billion in 2014 (down from $1.1 trillion in 2012).
“While budget deficits continue to fall, addressing the federal debt as a whole is still a work in progress,” Anderson said. “Much more needs to be done to reduce the federal deficit over the long term.”
The members of the 2013 ABA Economic Advisory Committee are:
ReadThe RestEntry..
According to the committee, which includes 13 chief economists from among the largest banks in North America, inflation-adjusted GDP growth for the first half of 2013 will be below 2 percent, and is expected to increase to 2.6 percent in this year’s fourth quarter.
The group believes the economy will be shaped this year by the struggle between private sector momentum and the inevitable fiscal drag that comes from the tax and spending decisions made by Congress.
The private sector economy appears poised for sustainable growth. However, the tax hikes made at the start of 2013 will create a drag on GDP growth of at least 1.25 percent, and additional budget cuts from sequestration could further restrain growth.
“If you double down on austerity this year, you’re flirting with recession,” Scott Anderson, committee chairman and Bank of the West chief economist, said. “Resolving the debt ceiling and providing clarity on taxes and spending will boost confidence, opening the door for faster growth at a critical point in the economic expansion.”
While job creation is expected to weaken in the first half of 2013, the bank economists predict that unemployment will continue its slow but steady decline.
“The committee’s consensus is that unemployment will fall to 7.4 percent by year-end,” Anderson said.
The committee sees the housing recovery gaining strength this year, with improving construction levels and rising home sales and prices combining to bolster the housing market in 2013. The committee forecast is that home prices nationwide will rise 4.3 percent and residential investment will increase 12.9 percent.
“Rising home prices create a wealth effect that’s critical to supporting consumer spending and economic expansion,” Anderson said.
According to the committee, consumer spending growth will be positive, but will not improve from last year’s pace. Consumer spending, which represents 70 percent of the economy, is expected to grow only 1.8 percent for 2013 as a whole - about the same as last year.
“We expect consumer spending to slow in the first half of this year as higher taxes reduce consumers’ take-home pay,” Anderson said. “Consumer spending will pick up in the second half of 2013 as housing activity and consumer confidence gain strength.”
While the committee forecasts a slight rise in long-term interest rates, short-term rates will remain exceptionally low in 2013.
“Short-term interest rates are anchored by current Fed monetary policy,” Anderson said. The committee noted that the Federal Reserve has adopted thresholds of 2.5 percent on its inflation forecast and 6.5 percent on the unemployment rate before it would consider raising the Fed Funds rate.
“The committee doesn’t see the unemployment rate falling to 6.5 percent until May 2015,” Anderson said.
The bank economists forecast that credit growth in 2012 will continue this year. Loans to businesses are expected to grow 6.5 percent in 2013, while loans to individuals are expected to increase 5.0 percent.
“The increase in business lending shows that banks are doing their part to make loans that finance our economy,” Anderson said.
The group sees the federal budget deficit continuing to decline, but remaining at unsustainably high levels. The committee’s forecast is for the federal deficit to fall to $925 billion in 2013 and to $738 billion in 2014 (down from $1.1 trillion in 2012).
“While budget deficits continue to fall, addressing the federal debt as a whole is still a work in progress,” Anderson said. “Much more needs to be done to reduce the federal deficit over the long term.”
The members of the 2013 ABA Economic Advisory Committee are:
- EAC Chair Scott A. Anderson, SVP and chief economist, Bank of the West, San Francisco, Calif.
- Scott J. Brown, SVP and chief economist, Raymond James & Associates, Inc., St. Petersburg, Fla.;
- Robert A. Dye, SVP and chief economist, Comerica Bank, Dallas;
- Ethan S. Harris, co-head of global economics research, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, New York;
- Stuart G. Hoffman, chief economist, PNC Financial Services Group, Pittsburgh;
- Peter Hooper, managing director and chief economist, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., New York;
- Nathaniel Karp, EVP and chief economist, BBVA Compass, Houston;
- Bruce C. Kasman, chief economist, JP Morgan Chase & Company, New York;
- Christopher Low, chief economist, First Horizon National Corp’s FTN Financial, New York;
- Gregory L. Miller, SVP and chief economist, SunTrust Banks, Inc., Atlanta;
- George Mokrzan, director of economics, Huntington National Bank, Columbus, Ohio;
- Richard F. Moody, SVP and chief economist, Regions Financial Corporation, Birmingham, Ala.; and
- Carl R. Tannenbaum, SVP and chief economist, Northern Trust, Chicago
Monday, February 3, 2014
Fiscal history part 2 1989 2010
(1989-1993 - Konstantinos Mitsotakis as Prime Minister)
Mitsotakis came in power through the social engineering priorly applied by Papandreou. People saw a financially ruined country where the private sector had to pay for hundreds of thousands of corrupt and counter-productive "workers" of the public sector. Having fed-up with the (masquarading as) socialist policies of PASOK, people thought that Nea Dimokratia would be the solution to their problem.
Having the consensus behind them, Nea Dimokratia and Mitsotakis, instead of limiting the government expenses, initiated the sell-off of state companies at prices way below what they costed - a scandalous move. People indeed wanted the rationalization of the public sector but did not tolerate well the sell-off of state-owned companies, which, solved nothing.
Since both these parties were/are controlled from globalist centers, and are both serving a longer-term agenda, it was probably assumed that after 8 years of "socialism" people would be pretty much ready to sell-off everything to international capital in order to save the economy. However that was not the case, and Mitsotakis fell from office.
Economically, by the end of 1993, the debt-to-GDP ratio had climbed to 110% (from 65% in 1989).
(1993-1995 - Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister)
Papandreou was re-elected and, aside from the re-nationalization of the public bus transporation system, most policies regarding privatizations were kept, although modified. For example instead of selling the Greek telco (OTE) to other foreign companies (as Mitsotakis had planned), there was a plan to put the company in the stock market, so as to sell slices at a time.
From this, it was quite apparent that the socialist ideology was really non-existant and that there was a larger plan all-along, that would be followed no matter what the government was. It is now discussed widely that "what Nea Dimokratia cant do, PASOK does", which signifies the understanding that PASOK will eventually promote those rightist policies that ND will fail to promote (due to opposition).
By the end of 1995 the debt was a relatively stable 109%.
(1996-2000 - Costas Simits as Prime Minister)
Simitis was a former minister of Papandreou that took over when Papandreou was unable to continue due to health reasons. He then went to elections with a general proclamation to the effect: times are hard and thus I promise nothing. The word promise, in this case, is what people would expect as "the highest bid" in terms of government spending (wages, pensions etc).
Simitis, continued capitalistic, rather than socialist policies, although from that point onward it was just a matter of degree... PASOK was trying to keep a profile that would position it a bit more left than the right Nea Dimokratia.
During the first 4 years, it was a period of significant growth for the economy due to favourable conditions internationally, the use of banking capital to feed investments and consumption as well as the stock market boom that peaked in 1999. A lot of significant infrastrure was made or planned for later during this period, including the Olympics of 2004. Greece also entered the european monetary union (eurozone) during this period of time.
Simitis initiated a period of extensively tampering financial indexes in order to make the country look better than it was.
One known factor is how debts were camouflaged or time-shifted. One less-known, and consequently less reported, factor is how the GDP itself was over-reported. This had positive side effects in showing reduced deficits, debt-to-GDP ratios and increased GDP growth. The way this was achieved was by under-reporting inflation. Since real GDP is the growth of GDP minus inflation, by under-reporting inflation it was possible to show larger growth, larger real GDP, less deficits and debt-to-GDP ratio.
By 2000, debt had fell to 103%, although,
- since 1996, there were many billion euros of influx due to selling of state corporations (entirely, or slices - in the stock market). "Mysteriously", people in Greece had no problem when PASOK was selling profitable state corporations, while they were more opposed to it when Nea Dimokratia did the same.
- the government played with its own funds and pensioners money on the stock market (and lost quite a few) after the peak of 99.
- the government converted its external loans (yen and dollars) to the underpriced euro of that time (0.8 euros for a dollar vs 1.3+ euro for a dolar in 2003). In a sense, the government was betting against the euro rising - and lost, big time. This would lead to a loss of over 10 billion euros (in later years).
(2000-2004 - Costas Simits as Prime Minister)
People marginally re-elected PASOK in 2000, mainly because of fears that the stock market would go worse with Nea Dimokratia. People were betting en mass to the stock market during that period and so it proved a decisive factor.
In general, this period was not much different than the previous one, except, perhaps, widespread corruption and scandals coming to the surface. By 2004, PASOK was generally considered an extremely corrupt party.
Debt-to-GDP was around 99% in 2004, despite more selling of state assets and stocks (especially profitable companies) and sustained growth rates of 4-5%.
During this period, PASOK initiated a tax-cut for corporations (from 45% down to 30-35%) despite the fiscal deficits which did not really allow such budgetary income losses.
(2004-2009 - Kostas Karamanlis as Prime Minister)
Kostas Karamanlis, the nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis, was elected to "rebuild the state" in the contrast of prior corruption of PASOK governments. Instead of that, he went on to install people of his own party to the payroll of the public sector and public spending was increased heavily as a result. More corruption followed.
Selling of publicly held assets (stocks, state companies, ports, roads) took place in a similar rate to PASOKs government. In this period there were larger tax cuts for corporations (down to 25%) and the church (0%) - despite the deficits. Its estimated that more than 40 bn euros were lost in tax cuts of corporations, church and wealthy people during the decade 2000-2009.
Statistics were continued to be tampered and there was also an attempt to revise the GDP by 25.9% upwards. This would help make debts and deficits seem smaller, however Eurostat rejected the 25.9% claim and allowed a revision which was closer to 10%.
In 2009, seeing that the situation with the deficits was de-railing rapidly and that tough decisions had to be taken, Karamanlis opted for elections (knowing that losing was near certainty).
(2009 - 2010 - George Papandreou as Prime Minister)
George Papandreou, son of Andreas (founder of PASOK), had a pre-election program with a cost of approximately 10 billion euros... Papandreou claimed that, contrary to Karamanlis arguments that there is no money for expenditures, there were indeed a lot of money available!
According to Provopoulos, head of Bank of Greece, both Papandreou and Karamanlis knew that the deficit was approximately 7-8% with a tendency to hit 12% by years end. With hindsight, it was apparent that Papandreou consciously lied in order to be elected, knowing full well that his program was impossible.
He promised taxation fairness, help for the poor, reduction of tax-evasion and implementation of growth-policies that would make Greece pull out of the recession. He claimed that Karamanlis policies of indirect taxation, reduction of funding to public investments etc were catastrophic and that he would do differently.
What people got, was actually a lot more of those which were proclaimed as "catastrophic policies": VAT from 18 to 23%, gas prices from 1.05 euro per liter to 1.60 euro per liter, dramatic reduction in public investment (and theore reduced absorption of european support packages), wage cuts etc.
A more extensive article on Papandreous management of the crisis, will be posted on the following days.

ReadThe RestEntry..
Mitsotakis came in power through the social engineering priorly applied by Papandreou. People saw a financially ruined country where the private sector had to pay for hundreds of thousands of corrupt and counter-productive "workers" of the public sector. Having fed-up with the (masquarading as) socialist policies of PASOK, people thought that Nea Dimokratia would be the solution to their problem.
Having the consensus behind them, Nea Dimokratia and Mitsotakis, instead of limiting the government expenses, initiated the sell-off of state companies at prices way below what they costed - a scandalous move. People indeed wanted the rationalization of the public sector but did not tolerate well the sell-off of state-owned companies, which, solved nothing.
Since both these parties were/are controlled from globalist centers, and are both serving a longer-term agenda, it was probably assumed that after 8 years of "socialism" people would be pretty much ready to sell-off everything to international capital in order to save the economy. However that was not the case, and Mitsotakis fell from office.
Economically, by the end of 1993, the debt-to-GDP ratio had climbed to 110% (from 65% in 1989).
(1993-1995 - Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister)
Papandreou was re-elected and, aside from the re-nationalization of the public bus transporation system, most policies regarding privatizations were kept, although modified. For example instead of selling the Greek telco (OTE) to other foreign companies (as Mitsotakis had planned), there was a plan to put the company in the stock market, so as to sell slices at a time.
From this, it was quite apparent that the socialist ideology was really non-existant and that there was a larger plan all-along, that would be followed no matter what the government was. It is now discussed widely that "what Nea Dimokratia cant do, PASOK does", which signifies the understanding that PASOK will eventually promote those rightist policies that ND will fail to promote (due to opposition).
By the end of 1995 the debt was a relatively stable 109%.
(1996-2000 - Costas Simits as Prime Minister)
Simitis was a former minister of Papandreou that took over when Papandreou was unable to continue due to health reasons. He then went to elections with a general proclamation to the effect: times are hard and thus I promise nothing. The word promise, in this case, is what people would expect as "the highest bid" in terms of government spending (wages, pensions etc).
Simitis, continued capitalistic, rather than socialist policies, although from that point onward it was just a matter of degree... PASOK was trying to keep a profile that would position it a bit more left than the right Nea Dimokratia.
During the first 4 years, it was a period of significant growth for the economy due to favourable conditions internationally, the use of banking capital to feed investments and consumption as well as the stock market boom that peaked in 1999. A lot of significant infrastrure was made or planned for later during this period, including the Olympics of 2004. Greece also entered the european monetary union (eurozone) during this period of time.
Simitis initiated a period of extensively tampering financial indexes in order to make the country look better than it was.
One known factor is how debts were camouflaged or time-shifted. One less-known, and consequently less reported, factor is how the GDP itself was over-reported. This had positive side effects in showing reduced deficits, debt-to-GDP ratios and increased GDP growth. The way this was achieved was by under-reporting inflation. Since real GDP is the growth of GDP minus inflation, by under-reporting inflation it was possible to show larger growth, larger real GDP, less deficits and debt-to-GDP ratio.
By 2000, debt had fell to 103%, although,
- since 1996, there were many billion euros of influx due to selling of state corporations (entirely, or slices - in the stock market). "Mysteriously", people in Greece had no problem when PASOK was selling profitable state corporations, while they were more opposed to it when Nea Dimokratia did the same.
- the government played with its own funds and pensioners money on the stock market (and lost quite a few) after the peak of 99.
- the government converted its external loans (yen and dollars) to the underpriced euro of that time (0.8 euros for a dollar vs 1.3+ euro for a dolar in 2003). In a sense, the government was betting against the euro rising - and lost, big time. This would lead to a loss of over 10 billion euros (in later years).
(2000-2004 - Costas Simits as Prime Minister)
People marginally re-elected PASOK in 2000, mainly because of fears that the stock market would go worse with Nea Dimokratia. People were betting en mass to the stock market during that period and so it proved a decisive factor.
In general, this period was not much different than the previous one, except, perhaps, widespread corruption and scandals coming to the surface. By 2004, PASOK was generally considered an extremely corrupt party.
Debt-to-GDP was around 99% in 2004, despite more selling of state assets and stocks (especially profitable companies) and sustained growth rates of 4-5%.
During this period, PASOK initiated a tax-cut for corporations (from 45% down to 30-35%) despite the fiscal deficits which did not really allow such budgetary income losses.
(2004-2009 - Kostas Karamanlis as Prime Minister)
Kostas Karamanlis, the nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis, was elected to "rebuild the state" in the contrast of prior corruption of PASOK governments. Instead of that, he went on to install people of his own party to the payroll of the public sector and public spending was increased heavily as a result. More corruption followed.
Selling of publicly held assets (stocks, state companies, ports, roads) took place in a similar rate to PASOKs government. In this period there were larger tax cuts for corporations (down to 25%) and the church (0%) - despite the deficits. Its estimated that more than 40 bn euros were lost in tax cuts of corporations, church and wealthy people during the decade 2000-2009.
Statistics were continued to be tampered and there was also an attempt to revise the GDP by 25.9% upwards. This would help make debts and deficits seem smaller, however Eurostat rejected the 25.9% claim and allowed a revision which was closer to 10%.
In 2009, seeing that the situation with the deficits was de-railing rapidly and that tough decisions had to be taken, Karamanlis opted for elections (knowing that losing was near certainty).
(2009 - 2010 - George Papandreou as Prime Minister)
George Papandreou, son of Andreas (founder of PASOK), had a pre-election program with a cost of approximately 10 billion euros... Papandreou claimed that, contrary to Karamanlis arguments that there is no money for expenditures, there were indeed a lot of money available!
According to Provopoulos, head of Bank of Greece, both Papandreou and Karamanlis knew that the deficit was approximately 7-8% with a tendency to hit 12% by years end. With hindsight, it was apparent that Papandreou consciously lied in order to be elected, knowing full well that his program was impossible.
He promised taxation fairness, help for the poor, reduction of tax-evasion and implementation of growth-policies that would make Greece pull out of the recession. He claimed that Karamanlis policies of indirect taxation, reduction of funding to public investments etc were catastrophic and that he would do differently.
What people got, was actually a lot more of those which were proclaimed as "catastrophic policies": VAT from 18 to 23%, gas prices from 1.05 euro per liter to 1.60 euro per liter, dramatic reduction in public investment (and theore reduced absorption of european support packages), wage cuts etc.
A more extensive article on Papandreous management of the crisis, will be posted on the following days.

Monday, September 9, 2013
Personal Loan Your Simple And Fast Answer to Fiscal Difficulty
By Hilary Bowman
Private loans are customarily unsecured money advances, i.e. They do not need collateral and depend on your credit and income for approval. Having a sound credit history makes it easier to get an individual loan, which may be authorized within 3-4 days. There are options if you have poor credit, but they'll cost you more.Regardless of credit, banks are often available who will give you funds quickly. Carry on reading to know more.
Where can you get Fast Private Loans?
Banks: If you happen to have got a great credit history, banks and credit unions should be the first place you must consult. Credit unions might also grant credit to long-term customers with a weaker credit history, dependent on earnings and money history. Funding usually takes 1-3 days.
Finance Companies: Finance firms are typically quick to confirm funding. With a great credit, you can apply for comparatively bigger loans to firms like CitiFinancial. With a low credit history you should look for local firms that often lend smaller amounts without collateral. Finance companies set the loans in such a way that's got a specific duration, say some months, to repay it with fixed payments. These companies often lend on the same day, though a few might take anywhere up to 2-3 days.Other similar loans you must keep track of: If fast money is your duty, you need to also check out these following loan services.
Installment Loans: These are available to everyone including those with poor credit. The catch is that these loans may come with high rates which can be as high as 95-100% of the total principal, depending on your credit history. Once you are done with the paperwork, funding usually happens overnite. Cashcall, Thinkcash are one or two corporations which provide installment loans with fixed payments and rates.
Pay-day Loans: They're convenient and straightforward to obtain. You are lent money without any collateral and also without a creditworthiness check. Borrow 200$ and you would write them a check for your next payday for 200$ plus the interest- 250$ for instance. IRs can be painfully high, as high as 800% annually. Pay-day loans should be reserved for emergencies, and you should never borrow more than you can afford to pay on your next income. Apply in the flesh and you may have your funds on the self same day. Online loans are delivered overnight.
Title Loans: Title loans use your automobile as the collateral. The company holds a lien but you keep driving the auto. Once the loan is paid off, the lien is known as off and the company returns the title of your car. Title loans have high rates and are typically written for a period of 30 days at a time. You can renew the title loan at the price of the interest each month, and you will still owe the principal and full interest when you pay off the loan. Title loans, like pay-day loans, should be kept for emergencies and if taken should be paid off straight away. The loan is granted on the same day of application.These are a few methods of getting tiny personal loans. As with any financial transaction, it is smart to be cautious. A finance consultant in these matters is invaluable. Be intensive in your research and you should not have any trouble finding fast personal loans to unravel your cash Problems.
Where can you get Fast Private Loans?
Banks: If you happen to have got a great credit history, banks and credit unions should be the first place you must consult. Credit unions might also grant credit to long-term customers with a weaker credit history, dependent on earnings and money history. Funding usually takes 1-3 days.
Finance Companies: Finance firms are typically quick to confirm funding. With a great credit, you can apply for comparatively bigger loans to firms like CitiFinancial. With a low credit history you should look for local firms that often lend smaller amounts without collateral. Finance companies set the loans in such a way that's got a specific duration, say some months, to repay it with fixed payments. These companies often lend on the same day, though a few might take anywhere up to 2-3 days.Other similar loans you must keep track of: If fast money is your duty, you need to also check out these following loan services.
Installment Loans: These are available to everyone including those with poor credit. The catch is that these loans may come with high rates which can be as high as 95-100% of the total principal, depending on your credit history. Once you are done with the paperwork, funding usually happens overnite. Cashcall, Thinkcash are one or two corporations which provide installment loans with fixed payments and rates.
Pay-day Loans: They're convenient and straightforward to obtain. You are lent money without any collateral and also without a creditworthiness check. Borrow 200$ and you would write them a check for your next payday for 200$ plus the interest- 250$ for instance. IRs can be painfully high, as high as 800% annually. Pay-day loans should be reserved for emergencies, and you should never borrow more than you can afford to pay on your next income. Apply in the flesh and you may have your funds on the self same day. Online loans are delivered overnight.
Title Loans: Title loans use your automobile as the collateral. The company holds a lien but you keep driving the auto. Once the loan is paid off, the lien is known as off and the company returns the title of your car. Title loans have high rates and are typically written for a period of 30 days at a time. You can renew the title loan at the price of the interest each month, and you will still owe the principal and full interest when you pay off the loan. Title loans, like pay-day loans, should be kept for emergencies and if taken should be paid off straight away. The loan is granted on the same day of application.These are a few methods of getting tiny personal loans. As with any financial transaction, it is smart to be cautious. A finance consultant in these matters is invaluable. Be intensive in your research and you should not have any trouble finding fast personal loans to unravel your cash Problems.
About the Author:
Hilary Bowman is a Financial Expert who specializes in money lending for folk with low credit history or substandard credit history in her very own state.
Tuesday, May 21, 2013
CBO Comments on Fiscal Cliff
The scheduled increases in taxes and, to a lesser extent, scheduled reductions in spending – a development that some observers have referred to as a “fiscal cliff” – will dramatically lower the federal budget deficit between 2012 and 2013.
According to CBO’s estimates, this fiscal cliff will reduce the federal budget deficit by 5.1 percent of GDP between calendar years 2012 and 2013. Under those fiscal conditions, growth in real GDP in calendar year 2013 will be just 0.5 percent. CBO expects the economy to slip into a recession in the first half of 2013 as real GDP contracts at an annual rate of 1.3 percent before expanding at an annual rate of 2.3 percent in the second half of 2013.
However, eliminating or reducing the fiscal restraint scheduled to occur next year without imposing comparable restraint in future years would reduce output and income in the longer run relative to what would occur if the scheduled fiscal restraint remained in place. Federal debt held by the public would grow at a faster rate than GDP. CBO views this path as unsustainable – increasing the likelihood of a sudden fiscal crisis, during which investors would lose confidence in the government’s ability to manage its budget and the government would lose its ability to borrow at affordable rates.
Read the CBOs full report.
ReadThe RestEntry..
According to CBO’s estimates, this fiscal cliff will reduce the federal budget deficit by 5.1 percent of GDP between calendar years 2012 and 2013. Under those fiscal conditions, growth in real GDP in calendar year 2013 will be just 0.5 percent. CBO expects the economy to slip into a recession in the first half of 2013 as real GDP contracts at an annual rate of 1.3 percent before expanding at an annual rate of 2.3 percent in the second half of 2013.
However, eliminating or reducing the fiscal restraint scheduled to occur next year without imposing comparable restraint in future years would reduce output and income in the longer run relative to what would occur if the scheduled fiscal restraint remained in place. Federal debt held by the public would grow at a faster rate than GDP. CBO views this path as unsustainable – increasing the likelihood of a sudden fiscal crisis, during which investors would lose confidence in the government’s ability to manage its budget and the government would lose its ability to borrow at affordable rates.
Read the CBOs full report.
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